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What might critical theory contribute to the study of digital media? And 
how might the study of digital media help to advance, complicate or chal-
lenge concepts, theories and agendas associated with critical theory, 
broadly conceived? These questions are central to two recent books by 
David Berry and Christian Fuchs, who both draw on the theoretical lega-
cy of Frankfurt’s Institute for Social Research to analyse the social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political implications of new kinds of information 
technologies.  
The two books are set against the background of the accelerating and 
deepening entanglement of digital technologies and their accompanying 
concepts and practises with nearly all areas of human life, exemplified by 
phenomena such as ‘flash crashes’ caused by self-learning algorithms that 
trade with each other automatically; weaponised computer viruses capa-
ble of destroying military equipment; brain interfaces and ‘secondary 
memory’ devices; ubiquitous state and corporate surveillance; networked 
social and political movements; hyper-temporary digital jobs; gargantuan 
real-time data streams; drone assassinations; attention markets; 3D print-
ed guns; darknets and megaleaks. Berry and Fuchs both argue for the con-
tinuing relevance of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School (as well 
as their philosophical progenitors and progeny), whom have hitherto oc-
cupied a comparatively marginal position in new media studies, in under-
standing these developments. 
Fuchs’s Social Media: A Critical Introduction is a rich, readable and gener-
ously referenced primer to the controversies, promises and threats of 
many of the world’s most prominent social media platforms, digital ser-
vices and projects. His theoretical approach is informed by a mixture of 
readings of Marx, the Frankfurt School (including second generation 
thinkers such as Habermas as well as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) 
and the critical political economy tradition in media studies. Many of the 
chapters offer something like an immanent critique of the social media 
platforms under examination – unpicking and interrogating the promises 
and claims made about their transformative social and democratic poten-
tial with reference to critiques from popular and academic literature, as 
well as original empirical research conducted by Fuchs. 
In this manner Fuchs critically examines the role of Twitter and Facebook 
in social movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution; the ‘corporate colonisation’ of social media which are often 
praised for their participatory and democratic character; the unpaid digi-
tal labour and inhumane labour conditions at hardware factories that un-
derpin the profits of digital media companies; the ideology of ‘playbour’ 
(play labour) and working conditions at Google; Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg’s claim that ‘the world will be better if you share more’ in 
light of the company’s business model as ‘a huge advertising, capital ac-
cumulation, and user-exploitation machine’ (171); the political mytholo-
gies of Twitter as a manufactured and pseudo-public sphere; the politics of 
WikiLeaks and their stated support for what Fuchs contends is a neoliberal 
conception of ‘good governance’; and Wikipedia’s reflection of capitalist 
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class relations and the ‘infinite exploitation’ enabled by its licensing mod-
el, in spite of its potential as an emancipatory digital commons project. 
Throughout the book, Fuchs argues against technological determinist 
views that social media are inherently good or bad, progressive or regres-
sive, illustrating the multivalent and contested nature of the platforms 
under examination with examples and readings in each chapter. The main 
problem with social media, he suggests, is that they are ‘incompletely so-
cial’, in that they ‘anticipate a full socialization of human existence’ but 
are also ‘limited by capitalist reality’ (256). In the conclusion of the book, 
he contends that ‘an alternative Internet is possible’, a ‘commons-based’ 
and ‘classless’ Internet, ‘that is not based on capital accumulation, adver-
tising, profit, ideology and a stratified attention economy, but rather ena-
bles knowledge, communication and collaboration for their own sake as 
social activities between humans’ (257). 
At the centre of this vision for an alternative Internet are a ‘co-operative 
information society’ (264), and ‘participatory democracy’, which he 
equates with communism (239). He proposes a programme of measures to 
create the conditions for such an alternative internet, including stronger 
data protection legislation, opt-in online advertising, corporate watchdog 
projects and the establishment of alternative internet platforms. Finally, 
Fuchs says that in addition to what Slavoj Žižek describes as the ‘ever 
stronger socialization of cyberspace’, an ‘alternative societal context of 
internet use’ is needed (259). This new ‘collaborative society’ requires both 
participatory democracy and ‘collective ownership and control of the 
means of production’ (265). 
While Fuchs’s book is intended as an introductory textbook, the brief ac-
count of critical theory that it gives at the outset is notably broad and pre-
sents a remarkably unified agenda. It foregrounds the commonalities ra-
ther than the tensions both between different thinkers and generations of 
the Frankfurt School, as well as between the Frankfurt School and other 
thinkers who are broadly characterised as critical theorists (from figures 
associated with the critical political economy of media to Michel Foucault, 
Stuart Hall, Jodi Dean and Evgeny Morozov). While some of these ten-
sions are acknowledged in the text, as well as in the questions and exercis-
es at the end of several of the chapters, the heterogeneity of critical argu-
ments could have been more explicitly used to enrich discussion of the 
implications of social media, as well to give readers a more nuanced view 
of the work of different thinkers whose work is used. 
Fuchs’s treatment sometimes makes it seem as though adherents of criti-
cal theory of all stripes were in possession of a shared and coherent over-
arching political programme. However, the politics of the Frankfurt 
School alone (let alone the other ‘critical’ figures alluded to in the book) 
were notoriously diverse – ranging, as one recent article argues, from the 
‘engaged withdrawal’ of Adorno and Horkheimer, to the ‘Great Refusal’ 
of Marcuse, to the procedural democracy of Jürgen Habermas, to Axel 
Honneth’s politics of recognition (Chambers 2004). A more granular ex-
position of these views could have benefited the book from both a scholar-
ly and pedagogical perspective, as well as informing reflection about the 
different kinds of political responses to social media that have become 
more pervasive in the wake of concerns about privacy and the commodi-
fication of personal information – not to mention informing further criti-
cal engagement with the potential weaknesses and limitations of some of 
the critical thinkers alluded to in the book. 
Little is said about the early Frankfurt School’s rejection of the ‘vulgar 
Marxist’ conception of the reducibility of an epiphenomenal superstruc-
ture to an economic base – nor why purely economic analysis is not suffi-
cient for the provision of a critical theory of society according to these 
thinkers (see e.g. Geuss 2004). Further discussion along these lines could 
have been complementary to the book’s significant emphasis on the polit-
ical economics of social media (including profit models and ownership 
structures), as well as opening up space to further explore how social me-
dia, digital technologies and the practises and discourses around them 
contribute to the reshaping of politics, culture and society in non-
economic terms, and why this matters. On this score, there is a burgeon-
ing wealth of literature on social media from a wide variety of different 
fields that could have been alluded to more extensively and more sympa-
thetically, to discuss how the affordances and imaginaries of new media 
are guiding and reconfiguring ideals and behaviours in many different 
areas of life (such as – to give a few recent examples – Weller, Bruns, Bur-
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gess, Mahrt, Puschmann 2013; Rogers 2013; Gillespie 2010). 
To mention one more point: at the outset of the book Fuchs defines the 
‘critical’ in critical theory largely in terms of the critique of power, ine-
quality, ideology and political economy. Yet there are at least two other 
important senses of the term deriving from the post-Kantian philosophi-
cal tradition upon which the Frankfurt School draws, which are not ex-
plicitly highlighted in the introduction and which might nevertheless 
prove valuable for those interested in drawing on critical theory to study 
digital media. Firstly, in the wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, early 
thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School – notably Adorno and Ben-
jamin – had an interest in the conditions which enable and structure ex-
perience, as opposed to ‘pre-critical’ conceptions of experience as immedi-
ately given (see, e.g. Jay 2005: 312-360). Secondly, also following Kant, the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School aspired to be both self-critical and 
self-reflexive (see, e.g. Rush 2004: 10). These two senses of the term could 
be potentially relevant, for example, when thinking about how experience 
might be structured and mediated by digital technologies, or when think-
ing about the concepts, theories and ideals which are deployed in examin-
ing them. 
David Berry’s Critical Theory and the Digital is more explicitly cognisant 
of both the heterogeneity of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, as 
well as the way in which it draws on and reacts against the Kantian con-
ception of critical philosophy. While Fuchs’s book guides the reader 
through a series of engagements with particular platforms, services and 
projects, Berry’s book takes a much more expansive look at how the theo-
retical resources of critical theory might be used to think about and criti-
cally engage with digital technologies and digital media. He is concerned 
not only with social media, but with how ‘computational capitalism’ as-
pires to ‘remake the world in its computational image’ (127) – in particu-
lar focusing on the role of software. Central to his account is the notion of 
‘computationality’, which is ‘a specific historical constellation of intelligi-
bility’ (60) that is ‘defined by a certain set of computational knowledges, 
practices, methods and categories’ (94). 
 
From the Frankfurt School tradition Berry mainly focuses on Horkheim-
er, Adorno and Marcuse – commenting in a footnote that he plans to ex-
amine the relevance of studying the digital in later figures like Jürgen Ha-
bermas, Albrecht Wellmer and Axel Honneth in another book (217). In 
addition to these thinkers from the Frankfurt School, Berry’s book is well-
versed in contemporary media and new media theory, and draws exten-
sively on arguments, concepts and insights from a wide range of social 
theorists, philosophers and other thinkers in fashioning his own outline 
of a critical theory of the digital – from Latour to Kittler, Stiegler to Gad-
amer. But the two figures to whom Berry owes most in the book are 
Adorno and Heidegger. He refashions and synthesises elements of Ador-
no’s negative dialectics and Heidegger’s phenomenological account of 
technology in the service of a new programme for studying the digital. 
While Heidegger’s phenomenology serves as the backdrop to his account 
of computationality, Berry follows Adorno in challenging its ‘metaphysi-
cal’ character and in insisting on a re-reading which is more attentive to 
the social and historical mediation of beings rather than the ‘epochal his-
tory of Being’ (91-92). He argues that Heidegger’s notion of technicity – 
characterised by the experience of beings as ‘objects that can be submitted 
to control’ – may be useful in understanding ‘modern’ technologies like 
electricity as ‘standing reserve’, but is a poor fit for understanding ‘post-
modern real-time data stream technologies’ (60). To address this gap he 
proposes that the concept of ‘computationality’ is better suited to analys-
ing the distinctive affordances of software and data streams, and their 
growing role in organising, schematising and providing a grammar for 
being, life, labour, politics, economics, society and culture in the twenty-
first century. 
Berry offers the phrase ‘compactant’ (or computational actant) as an ana-
lytical device to assist with studying the complex computational struc-
tures and processes with which we find ourselves surrounded. The ‘para-
digm case of computationality’, he argues, is ‘code/software’ (95), which, 
as Rob Kitchin puts it, ‘codifies the world into rules, routines, algorithms, 
and databases, and then uses these to do work in the world to render as-
pects of everyday life programmable’ (123). Alluding to Adorno’s critique 
of identity thinking, Berry asks whether computationality has not come 
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to represent ‘the incorporation of identity thinking par excellence’ (196), 
and illustrates this with an exploration of the history and mechanics of 
pattern-recognition in software (128-130). Throughout the book Berry 
discusses a plethora of examples of what he argues is computationality in 
action - including in the form of web bugs and user tracking systems, self-
tracking and quantified self-movements, gamification, microlabour, the 
architecture of mass surveillance uncovered by Snowden, the algorithms 
underpinning financial systems and ‘cognitive capture by corporations 
through notions of augmented humanity and the computational inter-
vention in pre-consciousness’ (193). These kinds of ‘parameterization of 
our being-in-the-world’ (167) and delegation of norms and values into ‘an 
invisible site of power’ in the form of algorithms (189) leads Berry to ask: 
‘how much computation can democracy stand, and what should be the 
response to it?’ (193). 
One response to computationality about which Berry remains deeply un-
convinced is the loose-knit group of thinkers associated with Speculative 
Realism or Object Oriented Ontology (dubbed ‘SR/OOO’ for most of the 
book). This ‘first internet or born-digital philosophy’ (104) also draws on 
Heidegger, but Berry accuses its adherents of promoting ‘onticology’ (114) 
or ‘philosography’ (116), an essentially descriptive enterprise which fet-
ishises the enumeration of beings, often in the form of the ‘rhetoric of 
lists’ (110) and ‘cascades and tumbling threads of polythetic classification’ 
(117). He accuses this group of thinkers – including Graham Harman, Ian 
Bogost and Levi Bryant – of seeking ‘liberation’ from ‘repetitive accounts’ 
of human inequality and suffering, eschewing any sense of historical or 
social context, and celebrating the ephemerality of the objects of compu-
tational capitalism (112, 118). Berry condemns this philosophical pro-
gramme as an uncritical and apolitical theoretical derivative of computa-
tional capitalism, mirroring and venerating its manifold phantasmagorias, 
and abandoning conscience in favour of spectacle. 
Instead, Berry advocates the ‘public use of critical computational reason’ 
(214), as well as pursuing various strategies and practises to make the digi-
tal infrastructures of computation ‘visible and available to critique’ (209). 
He suggests that the exercise of such critical computational reason re-
quires more than a purely theoretical engagement, and proposes the de-
velopment of a ‘critical praxis’ centred around what he calls ‘iteracy’, or 
the practice of ‘being able to read and write texts and computational pro-
cesses’ (188). He argues that ‘the constellations of concepts that underlie 
and sustain computational capitalism need to be rigorously contested and 
the software that makes it possible hacked, disassembled and unbuilt’ (204) 
– and that ‘future critical theory of code and software is committed to 
unbuilding, disassembling and deformation of existing code/software sys-
tems, together with leaking, glitching and overloading these systems’ 
(147). Iteracy would be included in a programme of what Berry dubs ‘digi-
tal Bildung’, or the ‘totality of education in the digital university’ (188). As 
well as disassembling, disrupting, hacking and challenging the infrastruc-
ture of computational capitalism, Berry proposes the ‘democratisation of 
cryptography’, the creation of ‘protective structures’ and the ‘composi-
tion of alternative systems’ (147, 205). While these kinds of projects ‘might 
offer some respite’, he maintains that in the longer term ‘more collective 
responses will be needed’ (205). In the future, he says, ‘an active citizenry 
will be a computationally enlightened one’ (193). 
Berry’s book is a significant contribution towards rethinking the study of 
new media in light of critical theory, and for the study of critical theory in 
light of new media. His fluency and dexterity in assembling, animating 
and enlisting such a wealth of material in constructing his case will no 
doubt provoke further encounters between the fields upon which he 
draws. I shall restrict myself to commenting on two areas around which 
further elucidation would be welcomed.  
Firstly, in pursuance of the self-reflexivity which he commends in the 
Frankfurt School, it would be interesting to hear further reflection on the 
visions and ideals which inform his outline of a critical computational 
praxis – from the ‘glass boxing’ and ‘glass blocs’ that are his response to 
black boxes and blocs, to the emphasis on computationally savvy forms of 
disruption recognisable to both ‘cyberlibertarian’ hackers and Silicon Val-
ley pundits (as discussed in, e.g. Barbrook & Cameron 1996; Turner 2008; 
Streeter 2010). While he makes an intriguing but undeveloped allusion to 
‘open access and transparency as ideology’ (193), he doesn’t otherwise ex-
pound on the politics of megaleaks or computational, organisational or 
political transparency and openness, which would have been useful in 
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light of recent critiques of their malleability and use in advancing many 
very different kinds of political projects (e.g. Roberts 2012; Tkacz 2015). 
Secondly, while Berry explicitly states that he is largely focusing on the 
early Frankfurt School, it would be interesting to see how, if at all, his en-
counter with the critical theory tradition might assume a different form 
and emphasis through engagement with later thinkers. To mention just 
one point of interest in this regard: it would be informative to see his re-
sponse to Wellmer’s reservations about the critique of identity thinking 
and the ‘homelessness of the political’ in Adorno’s work (Wellmer 2007). 
Where do these two books leave us with respect to using critical theory to 
think about digital media? Has critique run out of steam, as Bruno Latour 
suggests (Latour 2004)? Or do our authors succeed in showing that there 
may be life in it yet? Even if we do not share all of their conclusions, 
Fuchs’s and Berry’s respective readings and reworkings of elements of the 
Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory may offer alternative and 
complementary frames, lenses and conceptual instruments for studying 
digital media to those already available in the nascent new media canon. 
Through their dialectical forays into the social, cultural, historical, eco-
nomic and political contexts in which digital media and the mythologies 
around them are performed, they challenge more rigidly descriptive ap-
proaches and encourage more ambitious theoretical experimentation. 
They both call for a stronger normative dimension to the study of digital 
media, for the development of critical praxis as well as critical theory, as 
well as for a fundamental re-imagining and recomposition of the digital 
structures and systems which shape and mediate ever more aspects of 
earthly life. 
 
Jonathan Gray is Doctoral Researcher in Philosophy in the Department of 
Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of Lon-
don and Research Associate at the Digital Methods Initiative, University of 
Amsterdam. More about him can be found at jonathangray.org. 
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